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Abstract—Recent years have witnessed a boom of connected
medical devices, which brings security issues in the meantime.
Medical imaging devices, an essential part of medical cyber-
physical systems, play a vital role in modern hospitals and are
often life-critical. However, security and privacy issues in these
medical cyber-physical systems are sometimes ignored.
In this paper, we perform an empirical study on imaging
devices to analyse the security of medical cyber-physical systems.
To be precise, we design a threat model and propose prospective
attack techniques for medical imaging devices. To tackle potential
cyber threats, we introduce protection mechanisms, evaluate the
effectiveness and efficiency of protection mechanisms as well as its
interplay with attack techniques. To scoring security, we design
a hierarchical system that provides actionable suggestions for
imaging devices in different scenarios. We investigate 15 devices
from 9 manufacturers to demonstrate empirical comprehension
and real-world security issues.
Index Terms—medical information systems, medical cyber-
physical system, security management
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, PACS/RIS (Picture Archiving and
Communications System/Radiography Information System)
has gone through digital evolutionary improvements, includ-
ing richer function, better user experience and advances in
security. However, few mechanisms were deployed to ensure
system security and data privacy. Farhadi et al. surveyed the
security situation in several Iranian hospitals and stated that
these medical information systems had the patient health data
while lacking in suitable mechanisms to prevent security risks
[6].
As these systems collect and manage highly sensitive data
and contain a number of embedded software and hardware,
here, we refer these systems to medical imaging cyber-physical
systems (MICPS) which have great demands on system secu-
rity and data privacy as they are life-critical, context-aware
and networked medical imaging devices [9].
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DICOM1 (Digital Imaging and Communications in
Medicine), an international standard for imaging data transmis-
sion and storage, employed encryption as its only protection
mechanism against cyber threats for more than 20 years,
while it introduced more security mechanisms in its latest
version. And in recent years, the industrial community begins
to highlight security concerns of medical imaging devices.
More standards were proposed to ensure the ability of imaging
devices against attacks, e.g., IEC TR 80001-2-2:2012 and
HIMSS/NEMA Standard HN 1-2013. However, the major
concern of mentioned standards is about compliance rather
than real-world security issues and whole lifecycle security.
So, it is urgent to identify the way adversaries attack and
the trade-off of defence against cyber threats for the medical
imaging cyber-physical systems.
Prior to the work, the authors presented an exploratory
overview of security issues of medical imaging systems and
discovered some security issues of devices from well-known
vendors [15]. This initial investigation showed that diagnos-
tic imaging systems are on fire. However, the work didn’t
illustrate a comprehensive overview of threat models and
protection mechanisms as well as detailed analysis.
Contribution The authors conveyed an empirical study of
medical imaging devices to understand security in medical
cyber-physical systems in this paper. In summary, the main
contributions are:
• we design a threat model and propose prospective attack
techniques for medical imaging devices;
• we introduce protection mechanisms, evaluate the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of protection mechanisms as well
as its interplay with attack techniques;
• we design a hierarchical system that provides actionable
suggestions for imaging devices in different scenarios;
• we investigate 15 devices from 9 manufacturers to
demonstrate empirical comprehension and real-world se-
curity issues.
II. THREAT MODEL
Medical imaging devices are expected to be used in hos-
pital internal networks and collaborate with systems inside
1https://www.dicomstandard.org/
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and outside hospital networks, respectively. As is shown in
Fig. 1, medical imaging devices are connected to hospitals’
PACS/RIS and vendors’ servers outside the hospital network
for patch upgrading, VPN establishment and remote control.
The PACS/RIS in hospital archives and renders the medical
images, from which doctors’ workstations access medical
images.
PACS/RIS
Medical Imaging 
Device
Doctor Workstation
Patch Upgrading
VPN Establishment
Remote Control
Internal Network
Fig. 1. Visualization of a typical medical imaging device in a hospital
network. Lines between devices/systems indicate data/control message trans-
mission.
A. Attack Vector
Based on the workflow, three types of attacks might be
feasible.
Remote servers poisoning. In most cases, the devices are
designed to receive upgrade patches, establish VPN (Virtual
Private Network) with remote servers and execute remote
commands. To this end, these systems maintain command
and control interface to remote servers. Once vendors’ remote
servers are exploited by attackers, they are able to push
malware, hijacking network traffic and execute remote control.
Internal network penetration. Many hospitals provide
public WiFi to patients while don’t employ network isolation
strategy. So, attackers are possible to perform port scanning
and social engineering to access these critical systems. In
addition, ARP spoofing is possible in this scenario to perform
MitM (man-in-the-middle) attack.
Physical brute-force. In some cases, malicious users are
granted physical access permission to these systems. For
example, although the attackers don’t know the PIN code of
a medical imaging device, he can view health data by taking
the machines apart and getting the disk. Also, most devices
enable the “Emergency Access” mode which provides basic
functions without any authentication. Accordingly, sufficient
physical defence mechanisms should be designed to avoid
physical brute-force.
B. Attack Techniques
Here, we present three standard workflows to attack these
devices within a network.
1) Port Scanning: Port scanning is the most popular tech-
nique for penetrating systems which probes a server or host for
open ports. A large body of tools like Nmap2 are developed
and vary in rule-libraries for port scanning. With the help
of well-designed tools, attackers can identify the service as
well as its version on an open port and leverage its known
vulnerabilities, e.g., OpenSSL HeartBleed Vulnerability, to
exploit it.
2) Traffic Analysis: In practice, the medical imaging device
is linked with an Ethernet line, and another Ethernet line from
the mirror port of the switch is linked with the workstation to
analyse all data transmission using Wireshark3. However, some
devices enable SSL communication, and attackers need to
install private certification to decrypt encrypted data. Besides,
some devices utilise VPN (Virtual Private Network) to send
health data which makes traffic analysis not available in this
case.
3) Reverse Engineering: Reverse engineering is the process
of analyzing software to identify the interrelationships of
different components and to discover security vulnerabilities.
It is regarded as a practical approach to exploit and penetrate
target devices. Usually, most software is presented in forms
of binary code, and some are even obfuscated to prevent
source code leakage. So, it is an extremely time-consuming
task, especially when the system is vast and complicated.
However, these systems are often installed with open-source
software. Hence, attackers simply discover vulnerabilities in
such software and attack target systems [14].
III. PROTECTION MECHANISMS
A. Encrypted Data Storage & Transmission
From the perspective of health data security, encryption
methods are first applied to increase security during data trans-
mission and storage. For example, manufacturer A provides
OpenVPN-enabled communication between medical imaging
devices and PACS/RIS system, when the security mode is
turned into the highest security level, so-called DoD Mode. As
a result, traffic is naturally encrypted. Some devices provide
https-based communication to enable secure transmission. In
terms of storage encryption, the developers claimed that users
could install the hardware security module (HSM) additionally,
which enables data encryption feature; however, it is not
installed by default.
B. Network Protection
Connected with a local area network, medical devices are
likely to suffer from man-in-the-middle attacks. For medical
imaging devices, a medical image standard, namely DICOM,
enables node authentication in its file header. DICOM uses
Application Entity Title (AE Title) to identify the DICOM
2https://nmap.org
3https://www.wireshark.org
nodes communicating between each other. To be precise,
devices utilise AE Title, an IP address and a port number to
identify a certain node in the network. Indeed, this mechanism
cannot defence the ARP spoofing. Attackers can use ARP
spoofing to create a fake node with a correct IP address
and send DICOM file with accurate AE Title at a correct
port. Hardly can devices distinguish the malicious node unless
other mechanisms are deployed. In other words, AE Title-based
mechanism only prevents the case that caused by errors rather
than malicious attacks. More effective methods for medical
imaging device node authentication remain to be studied.
C. Physical Safeguards
As is mentioned in the previous section, under the assump-
tion that attackers can have physical access to the devices, it is
necessary to deploy safeguards in case of brute-force attacks.
Typically, devices are based on a workstation from some
computer manufacturers such as hp. Hence, these workstations
are pre-installed with a physical lock to prevent illegal access
to hardware.
D. System Hardening
“System Hardening” refers to a series of software-based
protection mechanisms. Specifically, we investigate the func-
tion of the firewall, shortcut closure, patch installation and
anti-virus applications. Shortcuts need to be closed because
attackers can escape from the current interface and create a
malicious process by some shortcuts, e.g., Ctrl+Shift+Delete
in Windows system calling TaskManager and starting pro-
cesses.
E. Security Guidance
The reason we choose security guidance as a part of device
protection mechanisms is that human plays a vital in security
management and useful guidance can help users have a better
understanding of their security situations and make the better
configuration in their context. Current device guidance cares
more about the functions of devices and only presents little
security knowledge, and it is hard for a user without infor-
mation security knowledge to config the extremely complex
devices.
IV. EVALUATION AND INTERPLAY BETWEEN ATTACK
TECHNIQUES AND PROTECTION MECHANISMS
A. Evaluation
We refer to the evaluation framework proposed by Yuan et
al. [13]. Their dimensions of evaluation contain deployment
effort as well as runtime effort, and in this paper, we also
consider the effectiveness of protection mechanisms. The cost
of each protection mechanism includes the developers effort,
the runtime cost and the effectiveness, which are the three
dimensions shown in Fig. 2. To be precise, the area of circles
indicates the effectiveness of protection mechanisms. Based
on our study, different mechanisms vary in places and circle
sizes.
Deployment Effort
Runtime
Effort
High
High
VPN
HTTPS
HSM
AE Title
Physical
Lock
Firewall
Shortcut
Closure
Patch
Installation
Anti-
virus
Guidance
Fig. 2. Evaluation of Protection Mechanisms
Deployment effort is a term that presents an important
criterion to evaluate the performance of a protection mecha-
nism. For developers, the primary objective is to build secure
devices at as little as possible cost. The deployment cost guides
developers to adopt mechanisms which are easy to implement.
We would consider the criterion from the perspectives of
the change occurred on original systems and the cost of
equipment.
Runtime effort is a term that shows how much performance
would be influenced by a specific mechanism. It is important
to maintain excellent user experience and enable fast response
of devices. Specifically, hardware-assisted mechanisms do not
take into account of the runtime effort. Generally, we mainly
estimate the runtime effort by the volume of performance loss.
Effectiveness is the most important criterion to present a
comprehensive evaluation of protection mechanisms. Circles
in different sizes represent the effectiveness of protection
mechanisms. The detailed analysis is given previously.
Analysis https is much easier to develop when compared
with building a VPN server. Besides, VPN also requires
more runtime efforts than the figure of https. However, VPN
slightly outperforms https because it won’t be attacked in
the case that user installs a malicious certification though
it is quite uncommon. In terms of HSM, the encryption
together with decryption is completed by external hardware.
Thus, the runtime efforts are lower than others’ counterparts.
Integrated into DICOM standard, AE Title-based protection
mechanism tends to take only a little runtime efforts and
deployment efforts to authenticate remote node. As a means
of hardware-assisted mechanisms, similarly, the physical lock
doesn’t need many runtime efforts. But it is not easy to
install if not pre-installed by workstation vendors. Firewall
and anti-virus play an essential role in device protection. It
is not easy to develop a firewall or anti-virus software in
the customized system environment and consumes computing
resource to filter malicious traffic. But it is supposed to be
taken into consideration when users’ security need is high.
Patch installation takes a high number of deployment efforts as
well as runtime efforts. Besides, some compatibility problems
may take place when some software is upgraded. Despite the
enormous efforts, it is still worth and necessary to be adopted
for its great effectiveness.
B. Interplay
To have a deeper comprehension of the interplay between
protection mechanisms and attack techniques, we present the
detailed ability of protection mechanisms against cyber threats
in Table. I.
To begin with, VPN and https almost enable the same
feature in terms of secret communication, while VPN provides
better resistance against insecure certification. HSM utilizes a
hardware-assisted approach to prevent data from illegal access.
The attack technique corresponded with AE Title is hard to
summarize in that it is more an error-correction mechanism
than a protection mechanism. We argue that firewall can
prevent port scanning as well as reverse engineering, because
some firewall provides a malicious traffic filter, which, to
some extent, contributes to the defence of reverse engineering.
Similarly, patch installation also protects devices from being
attacked by reverse engineering. Timely upgrading can fix
vulnerabilities and provides a more secure system. Security
guidance is not a part of the hardware and software systems
of the devices. Nevertheless, from the perspective of products,
appropriate security guidance plays a fundamental role to
prevent threats introduced by human factors.
V. HIERARCHICAL SYSTEM
We present a hierarchical system for medical imaging device
security evaluation in Table. II. Note that “*” means the
mechanism is not required at this level. “©” means at least
one mechanism is taken to enable the corresponding feature,
while the mechanism(s) may not be effective enough. “X”
means at least one effective mechanism is taken to enable the
corresponding feature.
Whether a mechanism should be taken involves many
considerations. To establish the rating system, we consult with
experts with industry, government and academic background
respectively and refer to relevant standards and regulations. For
example, we use the notion of “Node Authentication” instead
of AE Title and add the concepts of “Access Control”, “Identity
Authentication” as well as “Data Traceability”.
For storage encryption, “©” means that either some of the
health data, including demographic data in the file header, is
not encrypted, or the health data is encrypted by a weak al-
gorithm, such as DES. “©” in transmission encryption means
that the communication protocol is out of date (such as SSL
3.0 and lower versions). Specifically, both https and VPN at
correct versions are regarded as “X”. For devices at CL1, node
authentication is not needed. For CL3 devices, mechanisms
such as AE Title are not adequate to provide the highest-level
security protection. Identity authentication is needed for all
levels of devices if applicable. It is not applicable for doctors
to complete identity authentication with bloodied hands when
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TABLE II
HIERARCHY OF DEVICE PROTECTION
Requirement CL1 CL2 CL3
Storage Encryption © © X
Transmission Encryption * © X
Node Authentication * © X
Physical Safeguards * © X
Role-based
Access Control
© X X
Identity Authentication
(If applicable)
X X X
Data Traceability * X X
Auditing © © X
System Hardening © © X
Security Guidance © © X
some devices are used in surgery. Data traceability is required
for CL2 and CL3 devices. Usually, UID in DICOM standard
can help to identify the source. Comprehensive auditing,
system hardening and security guidance are necessary for all
devices, while some small print may be different for each level.
VI. INVESTIGATION
A. Device Overview
We visited some manufacturers and evaluate their devices
in terms of security and privacy. The manufacturers are in-
ternational companies, which contain the most market shares
in the global medical imaging device market. To protect their
commercial reputation, we keep the vendor name anonymous.
B. Result
We tested 15 devices on the mentioned protection mech-
anisms as well as other aspects, e.g., authentication, data
archiving. We placed a selective result in Table. III and full
results will be available in extended version due to lack of
space. Note that “Partial” in Storage Encryption means that
the devices only encrypt part of health data; “Partial” in
Transmission Encryption means that the devices only encrypt
data in some special context; “Partial” in System Hardening
and Security Guidance means that not all requirements in the
term are satisfied.
As is shown in Table. III, none of the devices can fully
satisfy our requirements. Some devices only adopt fundamen-
tal protection mechanisms which can be exploited by some
attack vectors. In terms of encryption, the fact is that only
a small part of data is encrypted or well-protected. In terms
of transmission, there is an essential point that while some
devices design a grading system and adopt full support to
the security requirements at the highest level, the default
configuration only meets the lowest level where molecular
mechanisms are adopted.
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C. Additional Security Issues
Some critical issues in current systems are not presented in
the table, and we describe as follows.
• The implement of data restore is vulnerable as well. Most
back-up data is stored by plaintext, and little validation
mechanisms are considered.
• Auditing function is not well designed in many devices.
Many devices even don’t record user logging, and some
records are duplicate or incomplete.
• Most devices pre-installed open-source software, such
as OpenSSH, FTP Server and Samba. However, lacking
in timely upgrading, these software suffers from some
vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2016-100104, CVE-2012-
00025 and CVE-2017-01436).
VII. RELATED WORK
Fu et al. firstly found that software radio can be applied to
attack implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICD) and pro-
posed three approaches for defence. They reverse-engineered
the ICD’s communication protocol. Then software-defined
radio attacks were applied to get patients medical information
and even turn off devices. Various aspects of implantable
medical device security have been further studied [3]–[5], [10],
[11].
Sametinger et al. gave a comprehensive overview of security
challenges for medical devices [12]. They presented challenges
along with illustrative examples. However, the cases related to
medical imaging devices are not described in detail as well,
and system security implications of medical devices are not
given. Kramer et al. studied the security quality of medical
devices under the administration of FDA Postmarket Guideline
[8]. They mentioned a recall of a radiation therapy system in
that the product has a software problem in which previous
patient measurement data gets associated with another patients
image.
Besides implantable medical devices, Tamara et al. pre-
sented an experimental study of the surgical teleoperated
robotic systems [2]. They presented some Denial-of-Service
attacks on the Raven II robot. Then, Alemzadeh et al. proposed
a model-based analysis framework to detect and mitigate
attacks [1].
Jagannathan et al. presented an overview of generic medi-
cal device security frameworks and proposed a methodology
called “Cybersecurity Preliminary Hazards Analysis” for med-
ical devices cybersecurity assessment [7]. Their method is
based on guidelines and standards issued by official organi-
zations and used for embedded devices in their paper.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we test 15 representative devices and present
a comprehensive study of medical imaging device security.
We also compare the protection mechanisms implemented in
4https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10010
5https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0002
6https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0143
current products and possible hacking techniques and propose
the threat model to have a more comprehensive understanding.
A hierarchical system is introduced for different scenarios. The
system provides an actionable way for developers to improve
their products and for government agencies to evaluate de-
vices. The work we conveyed in this paper will be adapted in
the industry as a part of pre-market security assessment for
medical imaging products.
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